[Col. 946]

Serious armed clashes also broke out in the areas of the workshops on Leszno, Nowolipie, and Smocza streets. Two groups of fighters, led by the Communists Binyomin Lejbgott (Mikhael Tsharny) and Bronek Jaworski, and the anti-Fascist Yisro'el Kanal (Mietek, Yehuda), materialized. They were armed only with two pistols and one grenade. Although the grenade did not explode when it was flung, the resistance was so effective that the enemy pulled back, as stated unequivocally by Yekhiel Gurni, one of the Ghetto chroniclers.^[1] Among those who fell in the clash at the workshops were Lejbgott (the secretary of the PPR in the area of the workshops) and Avrom Fayner, the Bundist teacher.

There was even a resistance action at the Umschlagplatz itself. A group of 60 Jews, roused by the ŻOB member Borekh Pelts, refused to enter the rail cars, and mounted a defense.^[a] They were all shot.

The surprising encounter with a resistance confused the snatchers. The Ghetto chronicler Shmuel Vinter notes that by the next day, the heroes with swastikas were afraid to enter the basements.

The Aktion took place from January 18 to January 21.^[b] The enemy was able to haul only 6,500 Jews out of their hiding places. Because of the Jews' active and passive resistance, von Sammern had to withdraw his troops from the Ghetto.^[c] The Aktion was disrupted. Von Sammern did not want the situation to be prolonged, as it might rouse the Polish population. The stand of the Jewish fighters made such a strong impression in Warsaw that it became exaggerated in the telling, such as accounts of tank skirmishes, thousands of German fatalities, etc. The underground Polish press was full of reports about the battle successes of the Jewish Fighting Organization. This was evidence of the great unrest among the Polish residents and marked a shift towards active resistance. The People's Guard understood the situation very well, and as soon as January 20 their commander in Warsaw gave the command to mobilize for battle.^[d] Their press brought up the battle in the Ghetto as an example to emulate.

All this, and first and foremost the Jewish resistance, forced von Sammern to interrupt the Aktion.

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This cautious measure on the part of the SS and police commander, however, was not enough to restrain those in the Polish population who yearned for acts of resistance. Violence could erupt at any moment.

The occupier was once again aided by the delegation and leadership of the ZWZ (AK).^[e] Their reaction to events in the Ghetto was “stoic calm” “The representative of the authorities' delegation describes the situation concerning the Aktion,” states the Żegota report of January 29, 1943, “and believes that armed action is impossible because of London's ban.”^[f] In fact, at the end of January, the leadership of ZWZ (AK) intensified its propaganda against active stands. This was aimed against the USSR and the Soviet army, which was suffering heavy losses on the way to victory and liberation. The ZWZ (AK) command prohibited its soldiers from attempting assassinations in the occupying army. Von Sammern could thus sleep a bit more soundly, knowing that there was a local factor which held back the resistance movement.

But the impression of the January action by the Ghetto fighters was very powerful, notwithstanding the “stoic calm” of the ranks that followed London's leadership. First and foremost, these events fortified the mood of the Jews. The literature produced in the Ghetto – the work of Yitskhok Katzenelson, Władysław Szlengel, and the news reports – proved the lasting effect of the clashes. New occupants of the Ghetto could have believed that the enemy was not all-powerful, that it would have to flee when faced with resistance, and that it could become terrified. News of the January battle in the Warsaw Ghetto reached Jews beyond Warsaw. Jews from the surrounding towns who were wandering around in the forests and the villages joined the camps of partisans from the People's Guard, such as those in the Demblin region. The news from Warsaw reached as far as Bialystok, where the example of the ŻOB inspired the local Jews to mount a similar resistance action during the first liquidation of the Bialystok Ghetto, less than a month later, in early February 1943 (the Bialystok Ghetto Underground Archive contains material about the events of January in the Warsaw Ghetto).

The period between January 1943 and the beginning of the Uprising, on April 19 of that year, was the final chance to prepare for the last great battle and the decisive period for shaping the Uprising, especially as regards the decision to begin the final battle. This period began after the first armed action of the ŻOB, and lasted until the middle of April, immediately before the Uprising. It was the time of one of the ŻOB's most important missions: healing the

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wounds sustained during the January resistance action (January 18-20, 1943), examine the failings, and reconstitute forces. The hemorrhaging during the January action was very significant; in some groups the losses amounted to four-fifths of the force. The ranks, which had become so sparse in January, became replenished with new fighters. Two major blunders of the January events became evident: a shortage of living quarters, and a lack of vigilance. The January attack by the enemy surprised the Ghetto fighters; besides, most of them were not billeted together. These two problems were soon solved. All the small groups of the ŻOB set up common living quarters, a common food and general supply, and increased military discipline. The lack of vigilance was also dealt with; housing the units together was a step towards greater vigilance. However, the ŻOB central command went further: scouts would keep watch around the clock at the Ghetto's gates and at other boundary points.

Thanks to its heroic action in January, the ŻOB became very popular among the Ghetto inhabitants. The term “Jewish Fighting Organization,” or its Polish equivalent Żydowska Organizacja Bojowa (ŻOB), became better known. Even more popular was the term “The Party.” The masses in the Ghetto did not distinguish between the ŻOB, “the Party,” and the People's Guard. The three terms coalesced into a single concept. According to well-informed witnesses, the leaders of ŻOB considered it a component of the general People's Guard.

The strongest stimulus to the Ghetto fighters' decision to begin the final battle were the encouraging reports of the great victory of the Red Army on the Stalingrad front. The triumphant Stalingrad operation was concluded on February 2, 1943. The Sixth German Army, commanded by General Paulus – whom Hitler had appointed Field Marshal just before the surrender to the Red Army – was completely surrounded and defeated, and had no choice but to capitulate. All the world, especially the nations under German domination, who had breathlessly followed the developments at the Volga River, realized the true historical significance of the battle.

Understandably, the impression made by the victorious outcome at Stalingrad was enormous. The best expression of emotions in the Ghetto was by a witness who, in January 1943, was stationed in an outpost outside the Ghetto, at the eastern train station, unloading rail cars that had come from the eastern front. These cars usually carried wounded

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German soldiers, mostly with frostbitten hands and feet. “Carrying them out of the rail car was the first time we worked hard and enthusiastically for the enemy. We felt the wind of Stalingrad.”^[g]

It was thus not a coincidence that in February, the month when information about the triumph of the Soviet army in Stalingrad and “the decline of the Fascist German army” (Stalin) became widespread in all corners of the occupied countries as well as in the Ghetto, and brought about a change of atmosphere, the Warsaw Ghetto fighters resolved to mount an Uprising; this decision was implemented two months later. Sara Żogel, a representative of the PPR's Ghetto committee, spoke at a meeting of the PPR's fighting group at the brushmakers' area, about the stance of the party in view of the situation, and posed the question of what should be done. She then raised the issue of an Uprising. Her contribution to the debate at this meeting was roughly as follows, according to an eyewitness: We are aware that an Uprising cannot end with any true victory on our part, but the decision in favor of it has already been made. The aims of the Uprising are as follows: 1) No longer permit a situation such as existed in July, 1942. 2) Hit the enemy as powerfully as we can. 3) Join the general battlefront against the Hitlerite occupiers. 4) After the Ghetto Uprising, flee into the forest, to the partisans.

In that same month of February, battle training of the ŻOB units intensified, as well as their ideological training. The fighters were taught that weapons should be seized from the enemy, and more bunkers and trenches should be prepared.

The main problem was a shortage of weapons. We know, from an earlier call by the ŻOB, that most of the organization's weapons in January 1943 were “primitive” (iron bars, sticks, axes, etc.), and did not include firearms. On March 18, 1943, the ŻOB leadership wrote to the ZWZ about the situation concerning weapons, that “it was catastrophic.” The shameful response of the ZWZ leadership is well known, and does not need repeating. The only real help, in the form of weapons, came from the PPR, the People's Guard. The problem of ammunition was the most serious. During the January-April period, each weapon was allotted only ten bullets. The ŻOB leadership made heroic efforts to buy weapons, mostly with the aid of devoted activists of the PPR, the People's Guard, and the socialist leftists, or from Żegota. The increased demand for weapons raised prices. The cost of a pistol

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“is rising immensely, and can reach as much as12,000-15,000 złoty. Bullets are 80-120 złoty each.” Large-scale purchase of arms would require enormous sums of money. The ŻOB budget also had to increase, due to billeting the fighting units. Most of this budget was covered by the Jewish community itself. People brought in money and jewelry, bakers donated bread, etc. However, there were also some who sabotaged the national battle. ŻOB had to “expropriate” funds from such currency traders, speculators, police officers, and partners in the German workshops. These operations brought in large sums of money for weapons. Those who refused to cooperate were placed in a jail set up by the ŻOB.

One of the most daring “expropriations” was the attack on the treasury of the Judenrat. Until now, only general information has been known. The course of events of this remarkable organized operation was concealed. However, new statements by eyewitnesses can provide an approximate description of the operation, which took place on the night of January 29-30, 1943. The Jewish fighters, wearing German police caps, terrified the police who were on watch in the Judenrat. The “expropriation” was carried out energetically and with great speed. Its leaders were the left-wing print worker, Shimen Mayufes, and Hersh Berlinski.

The next day, Judenrat chairman Likhtenboym alerted the proper German authorities. They came and wrote a report, but took no action, to the great astonishment of the Jews. Apparently, the enemy did not want to make such a “trifle” into a major affair. They knew, after the events of January, that the Jewish fighting organization was growing stronger by the day.

Eventually, the ŻOB acquired a dangerous criminal rival in the field of “expropriations”: bands of robbers, both Jewish and non-Jewish. The latter would come as “guest performers” from outside the Ghetto. These gangs often masqueraded as units of the ŻOB or other fighting organizations, extorted money, and carried out “expropriations.” The Jewish fighting organizations defended the population from these gangsters and fought against them.

The Jewish fighters carried out another important task during this time: “clearing the air” – the eradication of traitors and spies. As is known, the first justified act of revenge on a traitor took place in August, 1942. The fighter Yisro'el Kanal used a revolver that had been sent through the Warsaw committee of the PPR in an assassination attempt, which was not entirely successful,

[Col. 951]

against Józef Szeryński, the commander of the Jewish Ghetto police. The profound impression made by this first attack has been described above.

In October 1942, there was an attack – this time quite successful – against the Judenrat member and Nazi agent, Yisro'el Firsht; the next month, Szeryński's successor Jakub Lejkin, who commanded the police during the liquidation Aktion, was attacked. These death sentences were coordinated with the public warnings issued by the Jewish Fighting Organization. The first warning was published on August 17, 1942, and the second on October 30, 1942. In the second warning, which cited the earlier one, the Judenrat, the directors and administrators of the workshops, the commanders, officers, and officials of the Jewish Ghetto police, and the group leaders and officials of the Workshop Security Force were all found guilty of collaboration, worker oppression, and abuse of the Jewish population.

Between January and April, the elimination of traitors expanded beyond isolated persons and took on broader dimensions. The largest operation to eliminate Jewish traitors who were enemy agents took place in February, on Świętojerska St., in the brushmakers' area, which was officially known as the German Army Quartermaster Office and Maintenance Shops. The operation took place on February 21. The details are now known from the report by the fighters as well as from eyewitness reports. Both these types of material are now in the archive of the Jewish Historical Institute.

The reports state that five Gestapo agents were attacked at 38 Świętojerska. Four were shot dead. One, the worst of them, Skosowski, was badly wounded; he later hid on the “Aryan” side. Apparently, he was so terrified of the Ghetto fighters that he was afraid to tell the Gestapo investigators the truth. Some time later, he was shot to death in his home on the “Aryan” side by a special group of the People's Guard, following a detailed investigation by the Jewish Fighters' Organization.

Arek Weintraub, a Gestapo agent who was shot on Świętojerska, had in his possession a document prepared for the Gestapo, which comprised a list of bunkers and a report of the mood in the Ghetto.

The February 21 operation made a powerful impression in the Ghetto. The most powerful figures, who were protected by the Gestapo, had been shot to death! Some right-wing circles in the Ghetto were so impressed that they decided to support the resistance movement.^[h] The leadership of the Jewish Fighting Organization

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was now able to announce, in a letter of March 13, 1943: “Our operation in the brushmakers area ended in complete victory.”

The second act of revolutionary justice was carrying out the death sentence of the Gestapo agent in the Judenrat, the 75-year-old former Zionist activist and writer Dr. Alfred Nossig, who had apparently served the German spying operation for many years. As the talented SS Obersturmbannführer Franz Konrad observed, in the Ghetto, Nossig had placed his work at the disposal of the Germans. After the defeat of the SS and police chief Ferdinand von Sammern-Frankenegg, Nossig wrote six pages of a detailed report for the Security Police, with information about the Jewish resistance movement and with advice on the best way to carry out a new deportation in a “peaceful” way. The Jewish Fighters' Organization passed the death sentence, which was implemented by the fighters Avrom Dayer, Fayvl Shvartsshteyn and Motl Finkelshteyn in Nossig's own apartment at 42 Muranowska.

Death sentences were also carried out in February against Ghetto Police officer Firshtenberg (on Dzika Street), Gestapo agents Moniek Pruzhanski and his son, the Gestapo informer Anders (a Jew) who was on the verge of leaving for the “Aryan” side, and Gestapo informer Zinger (who was splashed with vitriol). One of the most loathsome Nazi helpers, Pinye the porter, was shot in a restaurant on Nowolipie by the fighters Tselnik, Khatskl and Yankl. Other death sentences on many Gestapo agents were carried out later, as well as during the Uprising.

Along with the project of eliminating traitors and spies, the Jewish Fighting Organization distributed leaflets calling for alertness against internal enemies. The leaflets included statements such as “Be careful at work! Remember that you are surrounded by provocateurs and agents!”

The Nazis rarely came to the aid of their agents when these were attacked. They were simply afraid. One eyewitness reports, “According to our information, the soldiers on watch were so afraid of the partisans that you could almost be sure they wouldn't show their face on the street while shooting was taking place.”

On the rare occasions that the Nazis showed up, the Jewish fighters greeted them with rounds of bullets. The fighting was also directed at workshops that had many German guards. One of the hated guards who was shot was “Pat” (he was very tall; another workshop guard, who was short, was nicknamed “Patachon).^[i] This operation was carried out by ŻOB members Sevek Nulman and Salek.

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On February 11, the fighters shot an SS man in the Nalewki neighorhood. They shot two gendarmes in the ghetto on February 18. Reports (now in the Jewish Historical Institute) were written by those who carried out the operation.

It should be emphasized that the enemy clearly viewed the increasing battle operations in the Ghetto with rising concern. The leading publications of the Nazi Security Police called for the energetic and complete liquidation of the dangerous resistance center that the Warsaw Ghetto concealed.

This was probably the time of Martin Bormann's conversation with Hitler in Munich, concerning the Warsaw Ghetto. This is reported by the memoir of Hitler's valet, Karl Wilhelm Krause.^{[j] [k]} He informed Hitler about the situation in Warsaw and told him about the resistance movement, emphasizing the fact that a radio found in the Warsaw underground enabled the Jews to maintain contact with forces abroad. When Bormann asked Hitler, “How should this be handled?” “Hitler thought for a moment and declared that if the report was true, there should be retaliations.” The Führer delegated such retaliations to Bormann, Himmler, and the SS commanders in Warsaw.

On February 16, Himmler sent secret letters to General Pohl, chief of the SS Economic and Administrative Main Office, and to General Krieger, the higher-ranking police and SS commander of the General Governorate.^[l] The last part of the letter includes the following: “The destruction of the Ghetto and the creation of a concentration camp is necessary, otherwise we will never complete the pacification of Warsaw. The treason that exists in the Ghetto will never be eradicated” Later, “I must receive a general plan for destroying the Ghetto. In any case, the Ghetto – which has until now been inhabited by over 500,000 subhumans and will never be suitable for Germans – must vanish from the face of the earth. The city of Warsaw, with its millions, which is constantly a dangerous center of resistance and incitement, will thus be reduced in size.”

Himmler's order of February 16, 1943, sealed the death sentence of the Warsaw Ghetto. The rapid execution of the sentence–regardless of the efforts of the military to postpone the Ghetto's liquidation temporarily, for economic reasons – was dictated for security reasons, as Himmler emphasized in his letter. In his opinion, Warsaw, including the Ghetto,

[Col. 954]

was a continuing center of resistance. The letter of February 16 did not call only for the deportation of the Jews but for the destruction of the Ghetto as well. The order to flatten the Jewish residential area, with over 500,000 people, was also aimed at the city of Warsaw. Nazi plans would have it degraded, hacked up, and made smaller. The plan, which originated in Berlin, marked the beginning of the general destruction of Warsaw, which was carried out a year later, in 1944.

Implementation of the plan was delegated to two proven murderers of nations, Pohl and Krieger. They had to carry out the two aspects of the same destruction: Krieger was ordered to liquidate the people and destroy the neighborhood, and Pohl – to remove the property. Krieger's order to liquidate the people and destroy the neighorhood after the central SS offices rejected the original idea of bringing a special unit of engineers from Nuremberg to destroy the Ghetto. The reason for the rejection is unknown, but we do know that the Nazis decided to employ the old tactics of diversions and “peaceful” deportation of the Jews before the final terrorist liquidation. The switch was because they feared that the events of January 18-20 would be repeated, perhaps even more widely.

The new diversionary methods intended to shrink and paralyze the Jewish resistance movement from within were certainly carried out by the Warsaw Security Police, by Dr. Hahn and the Gestapo officers Mende, Brandt, and others. Suddenly, a brand-new fighting group emerged in the Ghetto; it bore the name of the defunct underground Polish publication Żagiew, which had vanished in May, 1942 (its last issue, dated May 1942, is in the Ringelblum Archive).^[m] The new “fighting organization” – according to the impressions of the Ghetto chronicler Shmuel Vinter – was mysteriously initiated by Żagiew, and certainly done by Gancwajch. Gancwajch had reappeared in the Ghetto in February-March after a long absence. The new “fighting organization,” which was clearly a product of the Gestapo, began sounding revolutionary slogans in an attempt to exploit the belligerent mood of the Ghetto residents and provoke premature, partial actions, so as to cause a massacre and entrap the Jews. The diversionary activists required all the Jews to gather in front of the Judenrat building on Zamenhof, in order to “start the Uprising.” The Gestapo thus hoped to draw all the Jews out of the workshops, abandoned buildings, bunkers, and other hideouts, surround them on the square, and murder them on the spot, or drag them, screaming, to the Umschlagplatz. However, this deceitful maneuver was foiled by the vigilance of the

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Jewish Fighting Organization, as is clear from Shmuel Vinter's reports.

At the same time, Gancwajch was attempting to create an “Anti-Communist League” in the Ghetto. This maneuver, too, was exposed and defeated, as described by Shmuel Vinter. By that time, hardly any Jew in the Ghetto dared to think of participating in a fight against Communism and the Soviet Union.

The Jewish Fighting Organization not only called for vigilance, but also declared war on the leaders of the “Żagiew group.” A member of that group named Ignac was shot at 34 Świętojerska.

This particular diversionary maneuver by the enemy was unsuccessful. The Germans then adopted a different deceptive tactic, and once again masqueraded as conciliators. They thought that the dire situation of the Jews in the Ghetto would convince them to accept the “peaceful” scheme of “resettlement.” The bloodthirsty Brandt suddenly vanished, and “practical” merchants and entrepreneurs arrived on the scene, such as the civilians Fritz Schultz, Walter Többens, Stehmann, and others. They helped in spreading the propaganda that Jews could expect a paradise in Trawniki and Poniatowa; others who participated were outcasts from the Jewish community such as Hirshl, Vaynberg, and Glowinski (partners and directors of the German workshops), and many master craftsmen who had been bribed.^[n] As is well known, a delegation of eight Jewish master craftsmen from Lublin was brought in to corroborate the statements of Többens and his assistants. The Jewish Fighting Organization settled accounts with these traitors, just as it did with the previous ones. Hirshl was shot on the street in broad daylight. The bribed witnesses from Lublin got beaten up and were warned to be silent,

Nevertheless, Többens, the deportation commissar, attempted to organize the first transport of men and machinery. First in line was Hallmann's carpentry workshop, followed by the workshops of Schultz and Schilling, and the brushmakers' workshops. The Jewish Fighters' Organization came out with the slogan “Trawniki and Poniatowa are Treblinka!”^[o] The ŻOB slogan was picked up and soon spread widely. All 1000 workers at the carpentry workshop were ordered to report for the transport, but only 25 showed up. Többens's demand was undermined. The ŻOB was once again very active and nimble. Two ŻOB groups, commanded by Shloyme Vinogron and Motl Goldshteyn, set fire to Hallmann's warehouses and workshops, causing millions in damage to the German project

This successful action by the ŻOB resonated widely, not only

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in the Ghetto, but in the Polish undergound on the “Aryan” side as well. Gwardzista, the magazine of the People's Guard, dedicated an article to the operation, titled “The Resistance in the Ghetto” (No. 16, April 12, 1943). It included the following: “The attempt to evacuate Hallmann's workshop ended in complete defeat. This great project, with 1,000 workers, resulted in only 50 persons reporting for evacuation. The warehouses full of wood, boards, and completed furniture went up in smoke thanks to a group of Guards. The workshop area now had to be cleared of Gestapo informers, and the terrorist orders of the directors had to be thwarted.”

After the Aktion in one area – Hallmann's – was unsuccessful, Többens attacked a different area. In late February or early March, Többens attempted to “resettle” the workers from the workshops run by Schultz and Schilling. It was a repeat of the events at the Hallmann workshop. Only 250 of the 1,600 workers reported for deportation; many of that group, however, escaped. The Nazis caught many of the escapees and arrested them. The Jewish Fighting Organization then carried out a breathtakingly bold operation and freed the arrestees, near the German workshop guards, who looked on but were afraid to fire a single shot.

At the beginning of March, further acts of sabotage were carried out against the machines and raw-material warehouses of the German enterprises in the Ghetto. Jewish fighters set the SS warehouses in the Nalewkes neighborhood ablaze on March 6. These warehouses were combined with the workshops that supplied the quarantined buildings with supplies such as mattresses, beds, and blankets.^[p] The fighters used incendiary devices, termite bombs, gasoline, and kerosene.^[q] After firing two shots to alarm the guard, the explosives were ignited. The German guard hid out of fear and never fired a shot. The damages were great. The SS, police, German gendarmes, and firefighters arrived four minutes later, but it was too late.

Between March 4 and March 12, Többens made efforts to deport the workers from the brushmakers' area. However, these efforts were met by organized resistance on the part of the Jews. Only 20 of the 4,000 brushmakers reported for deportation. They had to be taken through “Aryan” streets, for fear that they would be liberated. The resulting situation led Többens to remove the machines only. The ŻOB responded by setting the machines on fire at the Umschlagplatz. Thus, neither people nor machines were removed from the brushmakers' area,

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thanks to the efforts of the Jewish Fighting Organization.

It now became clear that the second enemy tactic, that of “peaceful” schemes, was also futile. The Jewish fighters understood that the enemy would use any means to deprive them of their natural arena of battle: the Ghetto, its buildings who could be used as fortified positions, the underground bunkers, etc. The Jewish fighters clung to their battle area tenaciously.

After these two methods yielded no real results, the German security authorities decided to force the Ghetto residents to change their attitude by means of an unusually large act of terror. At the end of the second week of March, groups of Workshop Security personnel as well as soldiers rampaged through the streets of the Ghetto. Gangs burst into houses, shooting and pillaging. The Jewish Fighting Organization immediately began a revenge operation. At a prearranged signal, at 6 a.m. on March 14, fighters began to drive out the pogromists. This marked the beginning of the battle of March 13, which was the second-largest armed battle of the Jewish Fighting Organization before the Uprising.^[2] Some new documents and statements provide a partial picture of the events of March 13. One group of fighters attacked the German Workshop Security forces on Mila, when they were assaulting Jews. A clash began. One German fell dead, a second was shot while fleeing, and a third was disarmed by the Jewish fighters. The SS was immediately alerted, and entered the Ghetto, with the Gestapo. The fighters renewed their fire. One SS man was wounded. The ŻOB suffered no casualties.

The bold action of the Jewish Fighting organization in the early morning became a signal to attack the executioners. Groups of fighters and other brave people began chasing the Workshop Security forces. Ukrainian Workshop Security personnel were disarmed, and one of them fell after having been shot. SS men caught an armed fighter, who was freed by the ŻOB. Two Nazis were killed in the course of the clash.

A group of porters and smugglers appeared on Muranowa St; they killed a Luftwaffe officer who had come to the Ghetto as a “guest performer.”

A firefight broke out on Leszno St.

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A total of two Germans and one Polish scout were killed in this clash, and one Jewish fighter.

The SS forces retreated at 9 a.m. The Jewish Fighting Organization addressed the “Aryan” side in the morning of March 13 as follows: “The streets are now empty, and we anxiously await further events.”

A few hours later, Brandt appeared with reinforcements, and carried out a number of bloody reprisals. There was a “pacification” Aktion between 2 and 4 in the afternoon, during which any chance passersby were shot.^[r] People were pulled out of their homes and hideouts, and brutally murdered on the spot. This “pacification” took place on the section of Mila St. between Zamenhof St. and the Nalewkes. About 200 Jews were killed, among them 14 children. This reprisal operation stopped at 4 p.m.

We do not know the precise reson for the halt. The Germans may not have been ready to begin the ultimate liquidation of the Ghetto at that point. It is also possible that the success of the Jewish Fighting Organization in preventing the entry of 50 Nazis on March 13 played a role, as Marek Edelman testified in the trial of Jürgen Stroop; these forces had been sent by von Sammern to help Brandt.^[s] In any case, it should be emphasized that the mood during the battle of March 13 portended that of the Uprising. The atmosphere in the Ghetto was so explosive that a signal and a brave self-defense Aktion in which the first German was shot were enough to not only spur the ŻOB into action, but part of the population as well. This is clear from the communiqués of the underground Polish press, as well as the tone of the letter by the leadership of the Jewish Fighting Organization, and Marek Edelman's eyewitness statement. Edelman considered the German defeat of March 13 the second failure of the SS and Police Commander von Sammern (following the events of January). As is known, the third defeat was on April 19.

It may be assumed that this was when the Jewish fighters decided to carry out an attack against Franz Konrad, the SS director of the Ghetto's Office of Values Assessment; Konrad testified about this office at his trial in Warsaw in July, 1951. The attack was planned for on Niska St. It was not carried out because one of his “ministering angels,” a Jewish informer, gave him timely warning.^[t] Konrad did not show up, thus avoiding a bullet from the Jewish avengers.

When analyzing the later course of events, the increasing activity of the Jewish Fighting Organization should be emphasized. Regardless of its losses on

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March 13, the ŻOB made an announcement the very next day – the night of March 14-15 – calling on the population once again to thwart the deportation orders and mount an uprising. Apparently, this was thought necessary in order to prevent any wavering or weakening of resolve following the tragedy of March 13. Unfortunately, we do not have the text of this announcement. However, we can infer its contents from Többens's well-known public response. According to the testimony of eyewitness Bernard Barg, the ŻOB's final decision was approximately as follows: “Do not believe Többens. Like the other SS men, he wants to annihilate the last remnant of the Jews. Rather than go to your death, come out with weapons in hand!”

Interestingly, in his public response Többens completely ignores the “pacification” Aktion of March 13. He still expresses himself as a “peace-lover,” argues matter-of-factly with the Jewish Fighting Organization (referring to it by name), speaks of “persevering in the war,” etc. As we know, his response announcement was confiscated by the Jewish Fighting Organization.^[u] For a time, the roles were reversed. The Jewish Fighting Organization rules the streets, whereas Többens, the mighty slave-owner, becomes an object of ridicule. A satirical song written in the wake of these events by the Ghetto poet Władysław Szlengel became popular. The content was as follows: Többens orders the Jews to go to the East; the situation in the East soon changes and becomes so dangerous for Hitler's followers that Többens rushes into the Ghetto and begs the Jews to let him into a bunker.^[3]

Walther Cesar Többens's last action against the Jews is known. On Brandt's instruction, he attempted to invite the leaders of the Jewish Fighting Organization to a conference, with the Judenrat as mediators; the organization turned down the invitation scornfully. That was the end of Többens's “peaceful” mission.

These were the developments and the events that preceded the month of April. We could have mentioned a few more bold military actions, such as the operation in the workshop area (Leszno-Nowolipie-Nowolipki-Smocza streets), commanded by

[Col. 960]

Bronek Jaworski, when the two arrested fighters Stach and Salek were freed, or the liberation of Bronek himself. Such operations took place in broad daylight. However, we should point out other types of activity by the Jewish Fighting Organization at the time, which showed that the resistance movement was the true protector of the suffering Ghetto inhabitants. There were, for example, the attitude of the Jewish fighters to the problem of the abandoned children; and the literary evenings that were held in the brushmakers' area as well as on Mila St. Obviously, the atmosphere was not one of death. An even stronger illustration of the mood were the feelings of the Ghetto fighters towards the anti-Fascist comrades-in-arms on the other side of the wall. In hindsight, the letter to the “Comrades on the Other Side of the Wall,” sent by the youthful fighters in the Ghetto at the end of March, was very characteristic. This letter is a remarkable document, both politically and as far as the mood was concerned. The letter was published in Walki Młodych (Youth Struggle) the newspaper of the ZWM (the Union of Youth Struggle, the youth organization of the Polish People's Party), on April 5, 1943.

The letter concerns the battle readiness of the young Jewish fighters, the belief in the liberating role of the USSR, and the combat alliance with the progressive young people of Poland.

This was the mood of consciously anti-Fascist fighters. The attitude of ordinary people also became combative. This is clear from the document “Fragment of a Conversation” that was found in Part 2 of the underground Ghetto archive (the Ringelblum Archive). It is a written account of a conversation between a Jewish Fighting Organization activist and ordinary people on the street. The question of how Jews would react if the enemy resumed snatching for deportation was answered as follows: “What do you mean, what would I do? There'd be no need of propaganda then. I would gather all my friends, and we would pick up axes, poles, hammers; we'd go into the cellars and barricade ourselves in our houses. Let them come!… If one of them sticks his head into a room, I'll catch him. My axe would kill ten of them. I might be the eleventh…See what I've prepared for them, for our Jewish policemen,” he showed me a long, strong, well-sharpened knife. “They'll need God to protect them if they pick on me.”

The Jewish Fighting Organization took advantage of the profound shift in the public's mood. There was widespread campaigning to draw ordinary people into the battle. Flyers with rousing messages were distributed, such as the short call “To You” (in Polish). In this flyer, our

[Col. 961]

attention is caught by two points: the call for a unified battle front, and the faith that this is a battle for life, not for death; for Life, in the historical sense.

This was how the fighting Ghetto made ready. The last stages of physical and mental readiness were attained during the period of January-April. The final battle broke out on April 19, 1943.

Translator's footnotes

1. The PPR (Polska Partia Robotnicza) was the Polish Workers' Party. ŻOB (Żydowska Organizacja Bojowa) was the Jewish Fighting Organization. Return
2. The German Aktion means ‘operation,’ and in the context of the Ghetto refers to preliminaries to deportation of the Jews. Return
3. Oberführer (Senior Leader) Ferdinand von Sammern-Frankenegg was SS and police commander of the Warsaw area from 1941 to April 1943 Return
4. The People's Guard (Gwardia Ludowa) was an underground armed organization created by the Communist Polish Workers' Party. Return
5. The ZWZ (Związek Walki Zbrojnej; Union for Armed Struggle) was an underground army formed in Poland following its invasion in September 1939 by Germany. It existed from 13 November 1939 until 14 February 1942, when it was renamed as Home Army (AK, Armia Krajowa). This became the dominant Polish resistance movement in World War II in German-occupied Poland, and was under the command of the Polish government-in-exile in London. Return
6. Żegota was the Polish Council to Aid Jews with the Government Delegation for Poland, an underground Polish resistance organization, and part of the Polish Underground State. Return
7. I have added opening quote marks at the beginning of these two sentences, which are obviously a quotation. Return
8. Most of the resistance groups belonged to the political left wing. Return
9. Pat and Patachon were the German nicknames of a popular comic duo from Denmark, one tall and the other short, which appeared in many films during the 1920s and 1940s. Return
10. Martin Bormann was Hitler's private secretary, and head of the Nazi Party Chancellery. Return
11. The SS Economic and Administrative Main Office (SS-Wirtschafts- und Verwaltungshauptamt) was responsible for managing the finances, supply systems, and business projects of the SS. The General Governorate (General Gouvernement) for the Occupied Polish Region consisted of the parts of Poland that had not been incorporated into the Third Reich. Return
12. The SS Economic and Administrative Main Office (SS-Wirtschafts- und Verwaltungshauptamt) was responsible for managing the finances, supply systems, and business projects of the SS. The General Governorate (General Gouvernement) for the Occupied Polish Region consisted of the parts of Poland that had not been incorporated into the Third Reich. Return
13. Żagiew means “torch.” Return
14. Trawniki, south of Warsaw, was the location of a forced-labor camp for Jews. The town of Poniatowa was the site of a slave labor camp. Return
15. Treblinka, a major Nazi German concentration camp and extermination camp, was located near the village of the same name, 50 miles northeast of Warsaw. Return
16. The authorities quarantined entire buildings in attempts to stop the spread of disease. Return
17. The reference to termite bombs is unclear. Return
18. “Pacification” operations were meant to terrorize the civilian population by the use of military and police force. Return
19. Jürgen Stroop was a German SS commander during the Nazi era, who led the suppression of the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising in 1943. Marek Edelman was the last surviving commander of ŻOB during the Uprising. Return
20. The phrase “ministering angels” is translated from the Hebrew daily morning liturgy. Return
21. There is no elaboration of this statement. Return

Original footnotes

1. Some writers and witnesses want to minimize the resistance actions on Leszno, Nowolipie, and Smocza. But the authentic documents (Gurni's chronicle, the publications of the PPR [Polish Workers' Party], etc.) and the statements of other witnesses such as Jaworski, Dorke Goldkorn, Peltl-Mendrzicki, Edelman, and others, corroborate the facts presented here. Return
2. The facts of the battle of March 13, 1943 are taken from the Polish underground press; a letter of March 13, 1943, from the Jewish Fighting Organization; and many witness statements. Return
3. We learned that after the war Többens actually copied a Jewish idea. When he had been captured and was on his way to Poland to stand trial, he ripped a board out of the side of the train car – as did many Jews who were en route to Treblinka – and jumped off the train. It is probably true that his Anglo-Saxon guards helped him. [Translator's note: “Anglo-Saxons” in this context most likely refers to Allied forces.] Return

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